UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

12-2-2011

Quemada v. Arizmendez Appellant's Brief Dckt.
38831

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Quemada v. Arizmendez Appellant's Brief Dckt. 38831" (2011). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 3320.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/3320

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
RlCHARD ENRlQUEZ ORTEGA

Supreme Court Docket No. 388341-2011
Owyhee County Docket No. CV-1O-01389

Danielle Quemada, Personal Representative
of The estate of Richard Enriquez Ortega,
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
EFREN A. ARlZMENDEZ,
GILBERT ACOSTA, JR.,
Respondents.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District for Owyhee County.
Honorable Thomas J. Ryan, District Judge, presiding.

Douglas E. Fleenor, Attorney for the Appellant
702 W. Idaho St., Suite 1100
Boise, ID 83702

James M. Runsvold, Attorney for the Respondent
PO Box 917
Caldwell, ID 83606
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3. Statement of Case
Petitioner, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Richard Ortega, filed a declaratory
action asking the court to find that two parcels of real property were taken from the decedent by
undue influence or fraud, leaving the decedent, and therefore his estate with virtually no assets.
The original Petition was filed at the Magistrate level as part of the probate proceedings.
The Magistrate transferred the case to the District Court. Upon a hearing for summary judgment,
the District Court ruled that Petitioner had not established her prima facie case and dismissed the
Petition.
The decedent, Richard Ortega ("Richard"), died on November 13,2009. R. Vol. I, p. 32, L.
20. At the time of his death, Richard was single and had three children: Richard Ortega, Jr., Denise
Mota and Danielle Quemada. R. Vol. I, p. 3 I, L. 8. Decedent married Celia Ortega in 1985 and
separated in approximately 1999. R. Vol. I, p. 32, L. 9-11. Richard and Celia divorced on June 10,
2009. R. Vol. I, p. 33, L. 10. Richard was a truck driver with less than a high school education. R.
Vol. I, p. 34, L. IS. Celia was the owner of several rental properties and had purchased and sold
several properties over the years. R. Vol. I, p. 34, L. 4-6.
During Richard's marriage to Celia, Richard used his own funds from the sale of his premarital house in California to purchase a home located at 2081 Hill Road in Homedale, Idaho
("Richard's House"). R. Vol. I, p. 32, L. 13-15, R. Vol. I, p. 50, L. 6-7. Although Richard's House
was purchased with separate property proceeds, he titled his home in his name and that of Celia, as
husband and wife. Richard lived in this home while he was separated from Celia. R. Vol. I, p. 32, L.
20-21.

APPELLA TE BRIEF - 3

During Richard's marriage to Celia, she purchased property located at 28901 EI Paso Road
("Celia's House"). R. Vol. I, p. 32, L. 19. The property was titled in the name of Richard and Celia,
as husband and wife. Celia primarily lived in between this house and a rental house on 6th Street in
Nampa while she was separated from Richard. T. Gilbert Acosta, p. 12, L. 1-8.
Sometime in 2008, Celia began having financial troubles and informed Richard that in order
to protect his property from creditors, Richard's House, Celia's House and other three Rental
Properties would have to be transferred from the name of Richard and Celia to Celia's son from a
prior marriage, Gilbert Acosta. R. Vol. I, p. 51, L. 12-14, p. 87, L. 2-3. It is undisputed that Richard's
intent in transferring the title to Richard's House and Celia's House was in order to allow each party
to own their own house outright. R. Vol. I, p. 87, L. 3-4., T. Celia Ortega, p. 13, L. 20-25, p. 14, L.
10-12, p. 16, L. 1-4, T. Gilbert Acosta, p. 15, L. 13-14. Cel ia testified that part of the reason for the
transfer was so that Gilbert could "manage" the properties. T. Celia Ortega, p. 12, L. 1-13. Gilbert
was unaware of such an intent. T. Gilbert Acosta, p. 21, L. 11-19.
On December 30,2008, Richard and Celia Ortega executed quit claim deeds to Richard's
House, Celia's House and three Rental Properties in favor of Gilbert Acosta. T. Celia Ortega, p. 11,
L. 5-14. Celia admitted to preparing the quit claim deeds. T. Celia Ortega, p. 21, L. 7-10. It is
undisputed that both Celia and Gilbert accompanied Richard when he executed the Deeds. T. Celia
Ortega, p. 21, L. 5.
It is undisputed that Richard did not have the benefit of independent advice with respect to
the propriety of the transaction. If Richard had the benefit of independent advice, it is highly unlikely
that he would have agreed to the transaction as the proposed method ran the risk, and in fact the
transfer resulted in, his property being wrongfully taken.
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Gilbert Acosta testified that both he and his mother held a close relationship with Richard at
the time of the deed transfers. T. Gilbert Acosta, p. 8, L. 7-9, p. 10, L. 12-14.

It is undisputed that Richard Ortega received no consideration for the transfer of his interest
in Richard's House. T. Gilbert Acosta, p. 22, L. 8-11. Neither Celia nor Gilbert contend that the
transfer of Celia's House and Richard's House was intended to be a gift to Gilbert. T. Celia Ortega,

p. 15, L. 18-24, T. Gilbert Acosta, p. 22, L. 8-11.
Shortly thereafter, Gilbert transferred the three Rental Properties back to Celia individually.

T. Celia Ortega, p. 21, L. 19-25. However, Gilbert never transferred the title to Richard's House to
Richard and never transferred title to Celia's House to Celia. T. Celia Ortega, p. 15, L. 10-24.
Instead, in February 2010, Gilbert quit-claimed Richard's House to his brother Efren Arizmendez
and claims that he was fulfilling Richard's desire to transfer the property to Efren's daughter,
Desiree. T. Gilbert Acosta, p.17, L. 11-19, p. 22, L. 8-11. Celia Ortega never mentioned that the
intent of the transfer of Richard's House was to give a gift to Desiree. In fact, Celia testified that she
didn't know why Richard didn't get his house back as planned. T. Celia Ortega, p. 15, L. 18-24.
Both Andy Avila, Richard's best friend, and Elizabeth Ortega, Richard's former spouse, have
testified via affidavit that after the transfer, Richard believed that he owned Richard's House outright
and that it was his intent to transfer Richard's House at his death to his daughter Danielle, to be
distributed between his three children. R. Vol. I, p. 51, L. 1-3, p. 86, L. 9-10. Elizabeth Ortega
testified that even in the summer and fall of2009, Richard believed that he was the sole owner of
Richard's House. R. Vol. I, p. 86, L. 4-10.

Mr. Avila testified via affidavit that Richard did not trust Efren or Gilbert. R. Vol. I, p. 51, L.
4-5.
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It is undisputed that Richard's House was the primary asset of the Estate and as a result of the
transfer, the Estate's value has been diminished substantially. See a copy ofInventory as filed with
the lower court, attached as Exhibit "A".

4. Issues Presented on Appeal
a.

Whether the District Court erred in making inferences from disputed facts?

b.

Whether the District Court erred in not considering all the evidence in the

records?
c.

Whether the District Court erred in failing to recognize a presumption of undue

influence?
d.

Whether the District Court erred in not construing all disputed facts in favor of

Appellant, the non moving party?

5. Argument
a. The District Court erred in making inferences from disputed facts.
Although the Court correctly cited the standard for a motion for summary judgment where
the court is the fact-finder, it appears to have misapplied the standard in this case.
First, the Court is not permitted to make conclusive findings with regard to issues upon which
the parties submitted conflicting evidence. Banner Life Ins. Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable
Trust, 147 Idaho 117, 127,206 P.3d 481, 491 (2009); Williams v. Computer Res., Inc. 123 Idaho 671,
673, 851 P.2d 967, 969 (1 993).(holding that the trial court was not permitted to draw inferences
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regarding the parties' intent when the parties submitted conflicting evidence on the issue.) Moreover,
the Supreme Court in Williams appears to limit the Riverside holding to cases where cross-motions
for summary judgment exist. Williams at 673. In this case, cross-motions for summary judgment
have not been filed.
Moreover, in Chavez v. Barrus, 146 Idaho 212, 192 P.3d 1036, (2008), which Respondents
cite in their Summary Judgment Reply Brief, confirms that this standard only exists where there are
uncontested facts, so the only thing left for the Court to decide is the inference from those facts. See

Chavez at 218, 1042. Here, the facts with respect to Richard's intent are conflicting. Gilbert testified
that Richard's intent was for Efren's daughter to receive Richard's House. Elizabeth Ortega and Mr.
A vila testified that Richard's intent was for his own children to receive his home.
It appears that the Court erroneously drew inferences regarding Richard Ortega's intent when

the parties clearly submitted conflicting evidence on the issue. In fact, the Court even noted that "[i]n
this case, the record is replete with conflicting testimony regarding the intent of the deceased and the
purpose of the transfer." R. Vol. I, p. 100, L. 19-20. Thus, the Court erred in granting summary
judgment where a question of material fact with respect to the decedent's intent and the purpose of
the transaction exists.
b. The District Court erred by not considering all of the evidence in the record.
The trial court cites Vreeken v. Lockwood Engineering, B. V, 148 Idaho 89, 218 P.3d
1150 (2009) as standing for the proposition that a trial court need not search the records looking
for evidence that may create a genuine issue of material fact. However, that opinion in Vreeken
was in response to a motion for summary judgment where the respondents in Vreeken had failed
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to contest. Id. at 103, 1164. Instead, respondents in Vreeken argued that even though they had
failed to point to evidence in the record, the trial court should have searched the record to find
that evidence. Id. That Court held that a trial court is not required to search the record; instead,
the evidence must be brought to the court's attention.ld. at 104, 1165.
In the present case, facts indicating fraud and undue influence were brought to the trial
court's attention, including the following:
1. The transactions at issue herein were part of a larger scheme.

Four other

properties were transferred at the same time to Gilbert Acosta. Then, eight days
later, Gilbert Acosta transferred three of the properties back to his mother.
2. Celia had made several statements to Richard regarding the purpose for signing
the deeds.
3. Richard was an older man, was uneducated, his occupation was as a trucker, and
had been involved in two real estate transactions during his lifetime.
4. Celia was in the business of buying and managing rental properties as a source of
income.
5. The close relationships between Celia, Gilbert, and Richard.
6. Celia was married to Richard at the time the deeds were signed.
7. Celia had the deeds prepared and she and Gilbert took Richard to the title office to
sign them.
8. Gilbert benefitted from the deeds.
9. Undisputed statements that Richard's intent in signing the deeds was for the
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purpose of removing Celia's name from his property.
10. Conflicting statements between Celia and her son, Gilbert, as to why Richard's
house did not get transferred back to Richard.
11. Gilbert's failure to follow through on his claim of Richard's intent in transferring
Richard's house.
12. Affidavit testimony that Richard's believed the house was still in his name.
13. Richard's main asset was his home. The transfer left Richard impoverished.
14. Affidavit testimony that Richard did not trust Gilbert.
Unlike Vreeken, the Appellant contested the summary judgment motion and referenced
the evidence contained in the Petition, Amended Petition, Affidavits, and Transcripts which were
all in the record of the court. Therefore, the District Court erred in failing to consider this
evidence.

c.

The District Court erred in failing to recognize a presumption of undue

influence?
McNabb v. Brewster states Idaho law as to presumption of undue influence in holding
that when a grantor and grantee share a confidential relationship, and the facts and circumstances
raise an inference of fraud or overreaching, a presumption of undue influence arises and the
burden is cast upon the grantee to provide by clear and convincing evidence that the transaction
was fair and just and free from fraud or undue influence. 75 Idaho 313, 320, 272 P.2d 298, 302
(1954).
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In McNabb, the court found the daughter breached her promised to care for the mother in
exchange for property, which created an inference of fraud. The daughter also participated in the
procuring the conveyance, which created an inference of overreaching. ld at 319-320, 301-302.
Keenan v. Brooks, 100 Idaho 823, 826, 606 P.2d 473, 476 (1980), later distinguished
McNabb by citing the importance in McNabb of the property transfer leaving the grantor

impoverished, and disinheriting her heirs.
In Bongiovi v. Jamison, the trial court found facts in between Keenan and McNabb in that
the conveyance in question were not based on a promise by the grantee and did not impoverish
the grantor during his life, but did disinherit his adoptive step-mother contrary to his recent stated
intention. 110 Idaho 734, 737, 718 P .2d 1172, 1175 (1986).
The Idaho Supreme Court found the district court in Bongiovi had departed from McNabb
by not giving an instruction that the presumption shifted the burden of persuasion. ld The Court
then stated that the purpose for finding a presumption is to aid a contestant who lacks access to
the evidence of contact between the grantor and grantee, and announced a new presumption rule
which follows I.R.E 301. ld at 737-738,1175-1176. The Court then remanded and provided an
example of how the presumption would work in an undue influence case as follows:
If [disinherited heir] introduced evidence sufficient to show that
the [grantee] had a confidential relationship with [grantor] and
participated in procurement of the conveyances, then the burden of
producing sufficient evidence of the nonexistence of at least one of
the four prima facie elements of undue influence would shift to the
[grantee].
ld at 739, 1177.
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This rule is followed by Krebs v. Krebs, 114 Idaho 571, 575, 759 P.2d 77,81 (Idaho App.
1988), an appellate level review of the effect of quit claim deeds in a divorce action. Krebs also
cites Gmeiner v. Yacte, 100 Idaho 1,492 P.2d 47 (1979), in listing factors for consideration when
inferring improper influence, including whether the grantor received disinterested advice, the
providence or improvidence of the decision, the amount of consideration received, the grantor's
predisposition to make the transfer, the extent of the transfer in relation to the grantor's whole
worth, active solicitation by the grantee, and the relationship of the parties. Id
Krebs finds a husband and wife occupy a confidential relationship as a matter of law Id

(citing 23 AMJUR.2D Deeds, 205 (1983). The court held the findings including that the grantee
had prepared the documents, the grantor had not obtained independent counsel, and the grantor
had received no consideration, invoked a presumption of undue influence. Id at 81-82, 575-576
These courts recognized the Estate is in the difficult position of proving the elements of
fraud and undue influence without access to relevant facts. Because of this position, Idaho
Courts have, at least in a motion for summary judgment, imposed a presumption of undue
influence where, 1) the grantee was in a confidential relationship with the grantor, as Celia and
Gilbert have stated they were with Richard, 2) and the grantees participated in the procurement
of the documents, which has been admitted by both Celia and Gilbert. This presumption shifts
the burden of producing sufficient evidence of the nonexistence of at least one of the four prima
facie elements of undue influence to Gilbert. Since no evidence of this kind was presented, the
District Court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment.
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Further, similar to McNabb, where the court found a presumption of undue influence,
Celia and Gilbert had a close relationship with Richard and helped in procuring the transfer
documents, which creates an inference of overreaching.

Unlike Keenan, the transfers left

Richard without his main asset, thereby disinheriting his heirs. And like Krebs, where the court
found a presumption of undue influence using several factors, Richard received no consideration
for the transfers, the property transferred made up the bulk of Richard's estate, the transfers had
been solicited by Celia, and a close relationship existed between Celia, Gilbert, and Richard.
Additionally, Celia showed her disposition for fraud and exertion of undue influence by
recording a deed without obtaining a signature from Richard. These factors combine to evidence
undue influence, which precludes the intent required to execute a deed. Therefore the District
Court erred in not finding a presumption of undue influence.
d.

The District Court erred in not construing all disputed facts in favor of

Appellant, the non moving party?

For summary judgment purposes, the intent of the grantor, Richard, is a matter of
disputed fact. It is undisputed that Richard's intent was to have Celia's name removed from his
property. Testimony from his wife, Celia, fails to mention any intent toward Desiree, but instead
claims the transfers were accomplished so that Gilbert could manage the properties. However,
Gilbert was unaware of a management arrangement. The Estate produced affidavit testimony
from two witnesses who state Richard's intent was to pass his property to his three children.
Since the disputed facts must be viewed in favor of the Estate, the District Court erred in
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granting summary judgment because the intent of the grantor was not in conformity with the
deeds.

6. Conclusion
Intent of the grantor is not only material, but is the primary fact when considering a
transfer of property. Although the district court acknowledges the record contains conflicting
testimony regarding the intent and the purpose of the transfer, it concludes that not enough evidence
was presented to fulfill all of the elements for fraud or undue influence.
The court erred in reaching this conclusion because it did not consider all of the facts in
evidence, made inferences from disputed facts, failed to recognize a presumption of undue influence,
and failed to construe the disputed facts in favor of the non-moving party.
Therefore, the District Court's Judgment and Order Dismissing the Petition to Set Aside
Deeds should be reversed.
--'J .)-

Respectfully submitted this _~_ day of December, 2011.

Dougla
r
Attorney for Personal Representative
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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I, the undersigned, certify that on the -Z
day of December 2011, I caused true and
correct copies of the foregoing to be forwarded with all required charges prepaid, by the
methodes) indicated below, in accordance with the Idaho Appellate Rules, to the following
person(s):
James M Runsvold
623 S. Kimball Ave., Ste. C
PO Box 917
Caldwell, ID 83606
Bill R. Westmoreland, Jr.
U.S. Bank
17650 NE Sandy Blvd.
Portland, OR 97230
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[t{ U.S. Mail
[ ] Certified Mail-Return Receipt Requested
[ ] Fax - 459-0288
[ ] By Hand
rKU.S. Mail
[ ] Certified Mail-Return Receipt Requested
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Attomeys for Personal Representative
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF nIB TIllRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STAlE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR,TIlE COUNTY OF OWYHEE

IN THE MAITER OF THE ESTATE OF

CASE NO. CV-IO..Q1389

RICHARD ENRIQUEZ ORTEGA

INVENTORY
(I.C. § 15-3-706)

Deceased.

The undersiilled, as Personal Representative of the estate of the above-named
decedent, states and represents that:
The schedules attached hereto constitute a full and complete inventory of the

1.

property owned by the decedent as far as the same has come to the possession or knowledge of the
undersigned.
I

2.
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The values' set forth hi. such schedules are' the fair market values of the

decedent's property as determined as of November 13,2009, the date of the decedent's death, by the
undersigned.
Dated:

U'":00-\ l

()M\JlUt

J: ~~
.

Danielle Quemada "
clo Burkett Law Office
512 N 13th Street
Boise, ID 83702
208-344-2424
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Inventory of Property of
Richard Enriquez Ortega, Deceased
Dated: June 30, 2011
Recapitulation
Amount
Schedule A -

Real Estate

$0.00

Schedule B-

Stocks and Bonds

$0.00

Schedule C-

Mortgages, Notes and Cash

$0.00

Schedule D -.

Other Miscellaneous Property

ScheduleE -

Encumbrances

TOTAL NET V ALDE
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$21,000.00
$0.00
$21,000.00

Schedule A -- Real Estate
Item No.
1,

Description

Amount

Real Property located at 2801 Hill Road,
Homedale, Idaho.
Fair Market Value is listed at zero pursuant to
judgment in the above case ruling that Real
Property is not part of the estate.
An undivided one half interest in real property
located at 28901 EI Paso Road, Caldwell, Idaho
Fair Market Value is listed at zero pursuant to
judgment in the above case ruling that Real
Property is not part of the estate.

2.

$0.00

$0.00

TOTAL

$0.00

Schedule B -- Stocks and Bonds
Item No.

Description

Amount

None

$0.00

TOTAL

$0.00

Schedule C -- Mortgages, Notes, and Cash
Item No.
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Description

Amount

None

$0.00

TOTAL

$0.00

Schedule D -- Other Miscellaneous Property
Description

Item No.

Amount
$18,500.00
$1,500.00

l.
2.
3.

2005 Chevrolet Silverado
1992 GMC 2500 with Six-Pac Camper
Yellow chopper

$600.00

4.

Trailer

$300.00

5.

Riding Lawnmower

$100.00

6.

Miscellaneous personal property

$0.00

$21,000.00

TOTAL

Schedule E -- Encumbrances
Item No.
1.

Description
US Bank Loan No. 03000609319, secured by
real property at 2801 Hill Road in Homedale,
Idaho.
Fair Market Value is listed at zero pursuant to
judgment in the above case ruling that Real
Property is not part of the estate.

TOTAL
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Amount
$0.00

